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Abstract. Research in finance regarding the impact of ownership structure on the performance of the competing 
forms of firm organization is scarce. In this paper the ownership structures of co-operatives (co-ops) are analyzed in 
order to examine whether new models of co-op ownership perform better than the more traditional ones. The 
assessment procedure introduces a newly developed financial decision-aid approach, which is based on data analysis 
techniques in combination with a Preference Ranking Organization Method of Enrichment Evaluations 
(PROMETHEE II). The application of this multicriteria decision-aid approach allows the rank ordering of the co-ops 
on the basis of the most prominent financial ratios. The financial ratios were selected using principal component 
analysis. This analytical procedure reduces the dimensionality of large number of interrelated financial performance 
measures. We assess the financial success of 14 Dutch agribusiness co-ops for the period 1999-2007.  Results show 
that there is no clear-cut evidence that co-op models used to attract outside equity perform better than the more 
traditional models. This suggests that ownership structure of co-ops is not a decisive factor for their financial success.  
Keywords: cooperatives, ownership, financial performance, multi-criteria decision-aid analysis. 
1. Introduction 
Fifty-two years after the seminal work of Modigliani and Miller (1958), financial 
economics literature is still debating on the impact of capital structure (i.e., ownership) 
choices of firms on their financial performance. Three main theories dominate the field: 
trade-off theory (Kraus & Litzenberger, 1973), pecking order theory (Myers & Majluf, 
1984) and market timing theory (Baker & Wurgler, 2002). Trade-off theory postulates 
that firms weigh the advantages of debt (lower taxes compared to equity) against its 
disadvantages (increased probability for debt and cost of bankruptcy). Pecking Order 
Theory claims that, due to asymmetric and incomplete information, firms always use 
internal funds to finance projects. If internal funds are not available, companies often 
use debt. Equity is used only as a last resort. Finally, Market Timing Theory claims that 
managers issue equity when market valuations of their firms’ stock are high (i.e., the 
market-to-book ratio is high). That is, the capital structure of a firm viewed as the 
“cumulative outcome of attempts to time the equity market” (Baker & Wurgler, 2005, 
p.3). Past research has focused so far on empirically testing these theories regarding the 
formation of the owneship structure of corporate investor-owned firms (IOFs). Yet, 
preculiarly little attention has been spent on understanding the formation of ownership 
structure and governace of exchanges of collective business schemes (i.e., co-
operatives) and other non-corporate forms of organization.  
Mainstream research in finance has simply assumed that most firms are business 
corporations and analyzed the impact of their capital structure choices on their financial 
performance by using and/or comparing the three main theoretical angles. One may 
consider, however, that this general held presumption may be false since several 
competing forms of firm organization exist, including co-operatives (co-ops). The 
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critical point of distinction of co-ops and corporations (IOFs) is the nature and/or 
identiy of owneship. In a co-op business setting it is either the producers or consumers 
who formally own the firm, while in the business corporation it is the investors (Cook, 
1995). The study on the co-op capital choices and their impact on co-ops’ financial 
performance may provide a more complete portrait of firm organization, which may be 
essential of appreciating not only the outsanding variety with respect to the firm 
owneship models, but also the distinctive virtues of the corporate form itself 
(Hansmann, 1996).  As Holmstrom (1999) points out, economists are increasingy 
challenged in studying competing forms of firm organization, including co-ops, and 
view these forms as competitive institutions that form an integral part of healthy market 
economy.  
Co-ops play an important economic role in providing market access and 
competitive returns to independent producers and consumers in the U.S. and Western 
Europe. However, the financial restructuring of co-ops during the past 20 years has 
reflected sweeping changes that have occured worldwide. The “co-operative failures” 
through bankruptcies, liquidations, sales, or conversions to corporations have led 
several scholars and practitioners to question the financial viability of the co-op form of 
business. Research in economics and finance suggested that co-ops’ ownership structure 
is subject to a financial constraint (e.g., Vitaliano, 1983; Cook, 1995, Kalogeras, et al. 
2005). According to the co-op financial constraint hypothesis, co-ops are unable to 
acquire sufficient risk capital to finance profitable investment opportunities. Hence, co-
ops may be insufficiently capitalized to make the necessary investments to grow and 
remain a viable organizational form (Karantinis and Nilsson, 2007). The latter occurs 
because, for instance, agribusiness co-ops have traditionally adhered to exclusive 
members’ ownership in the form of direct investments or retained patronage refunds 
(Knoeber & Baumer, 1989, Barton, 1989). However, many co-ops, in order to 
successfully adapt to industrialization, have relaxed their traditional finance constraint 
(Cook and Chaddad, 2004). The extent to which co-ops relax this contsraint influences 
their ownership structure ranging from traditional (collective) to more individualized 
(investor owned firm – IOF structure alike) (Kalogeras, et al. 2007; Benos et al., 2009).  
That is, numerous co-ops in the U.S. and EU allow for individualized equity shares, 
invite nonmember parties to partially finance their operations, and publicly list parts of 
their equity stock (Kalogeras, et al. 2009; Bijman and van Bekkum, 2005). A question 
that arises is whether the individualization (i.e, IOF-alike) of the ownership structure 
drives the financial performance, that is, is the co-op ownership structure a decisive 
determinant of success?  
In the literature on the performance of co-ops and IOFs there have been 
followed two main approaches. The first one, is the neoclassical approach that deals 
with the efficiency of the two organizational forms and, consequently, the inlfuence on 
their functioning in the marketplace (e.g., Fulton and Giannakas, 2001; Notta and 
Vlachvei, 2007). The second approach accounts for comparisons among the financial 
ratios of co-ops and IOFs (e.g., Gentzoglanis, 1997; Harris and Fulton, 1996). The 
identification of differences in ratios, allows for the comparison among the financial 
performance of both organizational forms. These studies often empasize the superiority, 
in terms of financial performance, of the IOF-alike organized models. However, co-ops 
have experienced an inherently dynamic restructuring process (Kalogeras, et al. 2009), 
and in order to adapt to agricultural industrialization (Chaddad and Cook, 2004) have 
increasingly been involved in value-adding processing, branding and market-orienetd 
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activities and strategies (Benos, et al. 2009).  Hence, new co-op models have emerged 
that have relaxed their financial equity constraints by attracting outside equity (Chaddad 
and Cook, 2004; van Bekkum and Bijman, 2006).  As a consequence, property rights, 
ownership rights and residual claim rights, are redistributed in the intra-organizational 
co-op environment (Iliopoulos, 1998). The new models vary between the polar forms of 
the traditional co-op model and the IOF-alike model. 
The objective of this paper is the empirical assessment of the performance of 
agribusiness co-op models with differing ownership characteristics (i.e., traditional-
organized co-ops, member-investor co-ops, public listed co-ops). To the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first empirical study that compares the financial performance of 
co-op models with different ownership structures. Further, this study attempts to expand 
the current literature on firm capital choices with respect to the competing forms of firm 
organization. To address our objective we evaluate the performance of Dutch 
agribusiness co-op models. More specifically, we investigate which specific owneship 
models perform better than others. This allows insights on how the organizational 
reform of co-ops is linked to their financial viability by applying a newly developed 
multicriteria decision-aid methodological framework. This framework provides clear 
results: the selected co-op models are ranked based on their financial viability. 
Particularly, it provides insights on how co-ops outrank their peers, and, hence, whether 
newly emerged co-op models have attributed to this fact. These results may highlight 
the need for the development of a specific co-op model that is most suitable for 
organizational reform and improves financial performance. The remainder of this paper 
is structured as follows. In section 2, we briefly discuss relevant theoretical foundations. 
The decision context is presented in section 3. Section 4 describes the specifications of 
our modeling framework. Section 5 presents the results while in chapter 6 conclusions 
are drawn and research challenges are mentioned.  
2.  Empirical Studies on Co-ops’ Performance  
 
The economic and institutional environment of agribusiness co-ops has changed 
dramatically (Cook, 1995). The markets have been liberalized, the demand of 
consumers have become more stringent, there is a tighter legislation on the food quality 
and safety, technological development is not standing still, and global agricultural food 
grades and standards are introduced (Meulenberg, 2000).  As a result, co-ops have 
become more market-oriented, instead of being producer-driven, in order to adapt to 
industrialization, meet the new standards within the food supply chain, and compete in 
globalized liberal markets (Kyriakopolos, 2000). According to Cook (1997), the success 
of user-oriented agricultural firms (i.e., co-ops) depends on their ability to: (a) 
understand the property rights constraints faced in attempting internationalization, (b) 
upgrade their sustainable competitive advantages, (c) develop globalization or multi-
domestic strategies, and (d) create new institutions that simultaneously facilitate the 
enhancement of member-investor needs. Therefore, competitive strategies are launched, 
such as value-added processing, global expansion, and brand name development 
(Bijman and Ruben, 2005). Yet, the adaptation of these new strategies require 
restructuring of the co-ops’ financial structure and substantial capital investments 
(Baourakis, et al. 2002)  
The emergence of new co-op structures has been addressed over the last 20 
years by several co-op scholars (Hart and Moore, 1996; Harte, 1997; van Dijk, 1997; 
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Nilsson and Gunnarson, 2000; Chaddad and Cook, 2004; Cook and Chaddad, 2004; 
Bijman and van Bekkum, 2005; van Bekkum and Bijman, 2006, Kalogeras, et al., 2007; 
Benos, et al. 2009). Most of these studies show the re-engineering of co-op 
organizational forms from various theoretical angles: transaction cost economics (e.g., 
Hendrikse and Veerman, 2001a) agency economics (Vitaliano, 1983), incomplete 
contracting theory (e.g., Hendrikse and Veerman, 2001b), industrial organizational 
economics (e.g., Bijman, 2002), and behavioural economics (e.g., Kalogeras, et al. 
2007; 2009). Chaddad and Cook (2004) discuss new co-op models based on residual 
control rights and residual claim rights typologies. Their work distinguishes among 7 
organizational models (see please: Table 1). The first model is the traditional co-op, 
which is restricted to members only, shares are redeemable, the benefits go to the 
patrons, and there are non-proportional member investments. The last model, 
conversion or demutualization, implies the overall change of the ownership structure to 
a corporate profit-oriented, proprietary organization. In this later model, the residual 
claim rights and control rights are reassigned among stakeholders. 
In the work of van Bekkum and Bijman (2006), 50 cases of agribusiness co-ops 
that started experimenting with innovative capital and ownership structures over the 
past 20 years are discussed. The least innovative structural change was considered the 
possibility of appreciable and/or internally tradable shares. That is, members can 
capture part of the increasing co-ops’ value over time. In addition, co-ops can issue 
externally tradable subordinate bonds.  The advantage is that the bonds qualify as debt 
and no member control is lost.  Furthermore, external investors can obtain a stake at 
subsidiary or group level.  Then, there is the option of listing preferred stock.  Finally, 
the co-ops can convert into farmer-owned limited liability companies. All these 
structures have the benefit that control is maintained at the member level.  Moreover, 
two general categories publicly listed co-ops were considered: (1) co-ops that convert to  
IOFs as part of their listing process, the so-called “Converted Listed Co-ops” and (2) 
co-ops that deliberately decided to retain as much of their collective structure as 
possible thus creating hybrid ownership forms, which are known as “Hybrid Listed Co-
ops”. 
At a more empirical level, studies dealt with the evaluation of the performance 
of co-ops versus IOFs have followed two main directions: (a) studies based on the 
concept of economic efficiency and (b) studies utilizing financial ratios analysis. Porter 
and Scully (1987) studied the efficiency of co-op firms by means of a production 
function and concluded that dairy co-ops were less efficient than dairy IOFs.  Akridge 
and Hertel (1992) used a multiproduct variable cost function to compare the 
performance of farm supply co-ops and IOFs. Their results suggest that co-ops are not 
inefficient compared to their IOF-counterparties. Sergaki and Semos (2006) studied the 
parameters that determine the efficiency level of the agricultural co-op unions compared 
to IOFs in Greece. They provide evidence that the efficiency of co-ops is influenced 
differently than the efficiency of IOFs by factors, such as the economic size, leverage, 
business risk, and profitability.  
Other empirical studies focused simply on the comparison of the financial ratios 
between co-ops and IOFs. Lerman and Parliament (1990) compared the performance in 
the American fruit and vegetables, and dairy industry. They showed that co-ops in both 
industries were not inferior to comparable IOFs, in terms of return on equity, debt to 
equity ratio, and ratio of earnings to interest.  However, for the fruit sector, the 
managerial turnover ratios indicated a lower performance compared to IOFs. The dairy 
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Table 1: Structural Attributes of Cooperative Organizational Models. 
 
Attributes 
Traditional  
Cooperative 
 
Proportional  
Investment  
Cooperative 
Member-Investor  
Cooperative 
New Generation  
Cooperative 
Cooperative with  
Capital Seeking  
Entities 
Investor-Share  
Cooperatives 
Investor-Oriented  
Firm 
 
Structural         
 
Control               
Voting Rule 1 Member 1 Vote Proportional Proportional Proportional Proportional Proportional Proportional 
Management 
Board of Directors 
(BoD) BoD 
 
 
BoD &  
Professionals 
BoD 
& Professionals 
 
 
BoD, Professionals   
& External 
Suprvisory Body 
BoD, Professionals   
& External Suprvisory 
Body 
BoD, Professionals   
& External Suprvisory 
Body 
 
Ownership               
Claim to ownership 
rights:  
preferred shares members-only members-only members-only members-only members-only 
members and  
non-members 
members and  
non-members 
Transferability of 
rights No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Tradable rights No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Redeemable rights Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Appraisal of rights No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Cost/Benefit               
Net Income Through Price 
Through Price  
in proportion to  
patronage 
Through Prices  
in proportion to  
shareholdings  
and dividends 
Through prices based  
on expected 
patronage 
and dividends 
Through Price  
and Dividends 
Through Price  
and Dividends 
Through Price  
and Dividends 
        
 
Source: Cook and Chaddad 2004; Kuikman and Kalogeras (2009).  
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co-ops found to perform better based on the results of those ratios.  Harris and Fulton 
(1996) analyzed the financial performance of Canadian co-ops and IOFs. They found that 
co-ops were at least as liquid as IOFs; profitability of co-ops in the retail grocery and fish 
sector was found higher, while co-ops involved in the fruit and vegetables, feed, and grain 
handling sector performed better than IOFs with selling and marketing similar products. 
This study also provided evidence that co-ops were at least as productive as IOFs; the 
leverage within co-ops was sector specific; and the growth rates between co-ops and IOFs 
were found comparable. Further, Gentzoglanis (1997) compares the financial performance 
of dairy co-ops and IOFs in Canada. The results indicated that the economic and financial 
performance is comparable. There were not found any major difference in terms of 
profitability, productivity and the use of new technologies. However, there were pointed 
out significant differences in liquidity and working capital management.  In addition, 
Hardesty and Salgia (2004) confirmed the results by Lerman and Parliament (1990). That 
is, there were no significant differences between the financial performance of co-ops and 
IOFs in the agribusiness sector in the U.S. The only significant difference found was that 
co-ops showed lower levels of leverage. A more advanced methodological and modelling 
framework using the financial ratios analysis as a basic starting point was introduced by 
Kalogeras, et al. (2005). The study applied a multicriteria decision-aid system to rank-order 
the financial performance of Greek co-ops using several categories of financial ratios as 
data pool. The same methodology was further used by Zopounidis, et al. (2006) to analyse 
the performance of the agricultural unions in Crete. These studies focused on the evaluation 
and rankings of the financial performance of co-op firms, aiming at indentifying strengths 
and imperfections associated with the financial structure of co-ops.  
Most studies have focused so far on the strict difference in performance measures 
between co-ops and IOFs. This paper expands the literature by focusing on the performance 
of co-ops with differing ownership structures. Although there are some sporadic arguments 
(e.g., Nilsson and Gunnarsson, 2000) that the transformation of a co-op firm into a public 
listed company increase substantially turnovers, there is no clear-cut evidence about the 
performance of different co-op organizational models with different ownership structures. 
This paper makes a first attempt to explore whether the financial success of co-op models 
with different equity structures is based on the type of ownership model of a co-op.  More 
specifically, it is empirically tested whether the financial performance of co-op models 
entailing IOF-alike ownership attributes is better than the performance of co-ops with 
more-traditionally organized structure.  
3. Decision Context 
 
The dataset consists of 14 Dutch agricultural firms, which started as a co-op or still 
maintain (even partially) a co-op ownership structure at present. These 14 co-ops were 
selected on the basis of largest turnovers in 2007 (van Bekkum, 2007; Griffioen, 2007).  
Apart from the high level of their turnovers, the selected co-ops also have a substantial 
market share in the Dutch, European and global agribusiness industry. The financial 
structure of the selected co-op models ranges from traditional (i.e., collective) to IOF-alike 
(e.g., co-ops with capital seeking entities which attract outside equity capital). The annual 
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reports and income statements were collected from the Annual Report Database (2009) and 
Amadeus Database for the period 1999-2007. Missing annual reports and/or income 
statements were collected directly from the co-ops. It should be mentioned that the end of 
their book year for most co-ops is the 31
st
 of December.  However, for two of the co-ops 
included in our sample, AVEBE and CNB, the book-year ends at the 31
st
 of July and the 
31
st
 of May, respectively. 
Information about the organizational innovations of these co-op models was derived 
from the work of van Bekkum and Bijman (2004). In their study several Dutch co-ops were 
characterized by the innovative characteristics that they employ (see please: Table 2). As 
most marketing co-ops have transformed to farmer-owned limited liability companies, our 
sample compositions consist only on the cases considered in the work of van Bekkum and 
Bijman (2006). 
 
Table 2:  Innovative Characteristics of Dutch Co-ops in 2006.  
Cooperative Organizational Innovations 
Agrifirm n/a
* 
Avebe Appreciable capital structure   
Campina Appreciable capital structure; subordinate bonds 
Cebeco External investors; bought listed companies 
Cehave n/a 
CNB n/a 
DOC Kaas n/a 
Flora Holland n/a 
ForFarmers Farmer owned limited liability company with the option of external investors 
Friesland Foods Appreciable capital structure; permanent bonds 
Royal Cosun n/a 
The Greenery n/a 
Vion Investor owned firm 
ZON n/a 
Source: Van Bekkum and Bijman (2006)  
* 
n/a implies that the specific co-op has a traditional-organized ownership structure.  
 
4. Modelling Framework 
Following closely Kalogeras, et al. (2005), the first step in the assessment of the financial 
viability of co-ops was the financial ratio analysis. This put into perspective the balance 
sheet and income statement components of different cooperatives. Next, principle 
components analysis (PCA) was applied to the financial ratios. This procedure revealed the 
most prominent financial ratios in the dataset. Finally, a multicriteria decision aid (MCDA) 
tool will was utilized, namely Preference Ranking Organization Method of Enrichment 
Evaluations – PROMETHEE II – that rank-ordered the co-op models with different 
financial structures on the basis of their financial ratios (Brans and Vincke, 1985). The 
stages of the modelling framework applied are displayed in the Figure 1.  
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        Figure 1: Modelling Framework for Assessing Co-op Equity Structures.  
We selected a number of useful financial ratios to indicate the financial performance 
and risk bearing ability of the selected agribusiness co-ops. We categorized them into three 
different groups: profitability, solvency, and managerial performance ratios. Table 3 depicts 
the financial ratios used in this study. 
The next step was to identify the most prominent financial ratios out of the fifteen 
pre-selected ratios over a period of nine years. PCA identified the financial ratios that were 
most prominent. Specifically, PCA reduced the dimensionality of the dataset by extracting 
principal components that were uncorrelated, and explained as much of the variation in the 
dataset (the first component explains the most of the variation; the next explains most of the 
remaining variation, etc.). The process continued until there were as many components as 
variables used in the analysis. It revealed which financial ratios explained most of the 
variation in the dataset over the examined period (1997-2007).    
 
 
Table 3: Financial Ratios Used in Multicriteria Analysis 
 
Ratio group 
  
Codification 
 
Financial ratio 
 
Profitability 
  
GPM 
 
Gross profit margin 
  NPM Net profit margin 
  ROE Return on equity 
  ROA Return on assets 
  BEP Basic earning power 
    
Solvency  DR Debt ratio 
  QR Quick ratio 
  CR Current ratio 
  ICR Interest coverage ratio 
  LTLTC Long-term liabilities to capital 
    
Managerial performance  ITR Inventory turnover 
  ARTR Accounts receivable turnover 
  STLTR Short-term liabilities turnover 
  TATR Total assets turnover 
  FATR Fixed assets turnover 
 
Data Set: 
Financial Ratios 
Data reduction method: 
PCA 
 
P 
MCDA: 
PROMETHEE II 
  
 8 
Finally, the PROMETHEE II was used to rank-order the co-ops on the basis of their 
financial ratios. This method is based on the outranking relation theory by Roy (1968) who 
defined the outranking relation as a binary relation S between alternatives a and b in a given 
set of alternatives A, such that aSb means that alternative a outranks alternative b. 
PROMETHEE II also accounted for the indifference between two alternatives. This implies 
that the choice between alternative a and b could cause indifference or preference for 
alternative a compared to b. The construction of the rank-ordering through the 
PROMETHEE II involved the evaluation of the alternatives (co-ops in a set of criteria – the 
financial ratios). Each financial ratio was given a decision weight depending on the 
importance of the financial ratio. Next, the preference for co-op A over co-op B for each 
financial ratio was calculated. Finally, the preference index was determined as: 
 




n
i
i
n
i
ii
p
baPp
ba
1
1
),(
),(                   (1) 
where, pi is the weight given to criterion i, Pi (a,b) is the preference intensity based 
on the chosen preference function, n is the number of evaluation criteria, and ),( ba  is the 
preference index (which has a value between 0 and 1). The preference intensity is simply 
the preference of co-op A over co-op B (or vice versa) based on the difference between the 
values of criterion i. Brans and Vincke (1985) distinguish between six different preference 
functions (see: Figure 2).  In this paper, the Gaussian preference function was used for all 
financial ratios. This is a smoothed generalization of the other five functions. This means 
that there were no discontinuities, which satisfied the properties of the other 5 functions, 
and, hence, led to more stable results. The only requirement is that a parameter σ is known. 
This is the distance between the origin and the inflexion point of the preference curve. The 
standard deviation of the criteria was used as an approximation for σ. The preference 
indices for all pairs of alternatives (a,b) explained the dominance of the alternatives for 
specific criteria. Graphically this could be represented in a value outranking graph (see: 
Figure 2).  
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               Figure 2: Forms of Preference Functions 
               Source: Brans and Vincke (1985). 
 
The nodes on the graph represent the alternatives, which are the co-ops in this case, 
and the arc between the nodes represent the preference of alternative a over alternative b, 
when the direction of the arc goes from a to b, or vice versa.  The flow of the arc represents 
the preference index ),( ba . Next a distinction is made between the sum of the flows that 
left a node and the sum of the flows that entered a node. The former is known as the 
positive flow ϕ+(a) and the latter is known as the negative flow ϕ -(a).  The positive flow 
expresses how much an alternative dominates the other alternatives, and the negative flow 
how much it dominated by the other alternatives.  The difference between positive and the 
negative flow, ϕ(a) = ϕ +(a) – ϕ -(a), was the net flow for the node corresponding to 
alternative a (i.e., co-op A). It indicated the overall evaluation measure of the performance 
in node a.  Finally, the alternatives are ranked based on their net flow. The node with the 
highest net flow is considered as the best alternative, while the node with the lowest net 
flow was considered as the worst alternative. Thus, co-ops with the highest net flow have 
the best financial viability.  
5. Results 
5.1 PCA results 
 
Data reduction was achieved in 7 out of 9 years, with 3 to 5 extracted principal 
components. In addition, for most years there was a recurrence of groups of ratios in a 
component. As the correlations between several ratios were high, there was a high 
probability that these ratios were grouped together in one component. The total variance 
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explained across the years indicated how much the components explained the variance 
within the data set. Across the years, the total variance explained varies between 85.45% in 
1999 to 92.91% in 2002. This result indicates that the components had a significant 
explanatory power. In addition, communalities were found bigger than 0.6 and the 
eigenvalues for the components were larger than one.  
 
Table 4: Frequency of Appearance of Financial Ratios in the Components 
 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 
Frequency 
Gross profit margin             ■ ■ ■ 3 
Return on Assets         ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ 5 
Return on Equity   ■ ■ ■ ■         4 
Basic earning power ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■       5 
Net profit margin ■                 1 
Debt ratio                 ■ 1 
Current ratio ■   ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■   7 
Quick ratio   ■               1 
Interest coverage ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ 9 
LT Liabilities to capital   ■   ■           2 
Inventory turnover                 ■ 1 
Accounts Receivable turnover           ■     ■ 2 
ST Liabilities turnover ■     ■ ■   ■     4 
Total assets turnover   ■ ■     ■ ■ ■ ■ 6 
Fixed assets turnover       ■ ■         2 
 
To select the most prominent ratios across years, the rotated component matrix 
included the ratios with the highest loading were selected. If a component consisted of 
ratios that belonged to different groups of ratios (i.e., profitability, solvency, managerial 
performance), the highest ratio from each group was selected unless the difference in their 
value was too high. If the correlation matrix indicated that the ratio with the highest loading 
was highly correlated with the other ratios in the same component, only the ratio with the 
highest loading was selected. This results in the appearance of ratios presented in Table 4 
throughput the examined period. The last column indicates the frequency at which the 
financial ratios were at the most prominent each year. In the remainder of the analysis, the 
financial ratios with a frequency of four and higher were used to evaluate the financial 
viability of the co-op models with different ownership structures. 
 
5.2 MCDA results 
 
In order to rank-order the selected co-ops on the basis of their performance, a number of 
steps were taken. First of all, the preferences indices were calculated. Therefore, the 
decision weights for the criteria had to be known. The decision weights are crucial in the 
preference function of PROMETHEE. We followed closely the way that Kalogeras et al. 
(2005) defined the weights of the decision-criteria (i.e., method 1). In addition, a robustness 
check was conducted by creating 25 random scenarios and by calculating an average 
ranking of all scenarios (i.e., method 2). This check aimed at resolving the simplification of 
the decision weights adopted in the methodology. 
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The weights in method 1 are numbers that reflected the importance of each 
criterion. Different weights were used to examine how the ranking changed when different 
groups of ratios became more important. Table 5 shows the different scenarios used in this 
method. The last three columns show the weight of the group. For the first scenario, the 
weight for the profitability ratios (PR) was 1, which indicates that this ratio was considered 
the least important. The solvency ratios (SR) were assigned with a weight equal to 2, which 
implies that this group was more important. The weight for managerial performance ratios 
was assigned with weight equal to 3, thus this group of ratios was the most important. Then 
the weight for the individual ratios was determined by dividing the weight with the number 
of ratios in the group. Thus, for the first scenario, there were 3 profitability ratios, and 
hence the weights for each individual profitability ratio were the weight of the group 1 
divided by number of ratios 3. In addition, there were 2 solvency ratios, and hence the 
weights for the individual solvency ratios were the weight of the group 2 divided by the 
number of ratios 2.  The same procedure was applied for the remaining scenarios. 
 
Table 5: Weighting scenarios for the application of PROMETHEE II 
  RoA Bep RoE CR IC TATR STLTR Weight PR Weight SR Weight MPR 
Scenario 1 (1,2,3) 0,33 0,33 0,33 1,00 1,00 1,50 1,50 1 2 3 
Scenario 2 (1,3,2) 0,33 0,33 0,33 1,50 1,50 1,00 1,00 1 3 2 
Scenario 3 (2,1,3) 0,67 0,67 0,67 0,50 0,50 1,50 1,50 2 1 3 
Scenario 4 (2,3,1) 0,67 0,67 0,67 1,50 1,50 0,50 0,50 2 3 1 
Scenario 5 (3,1,2) 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,50 0,50 1,00 1,00 3 1 2 
Scenario 6 (3,2,1) 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,50 0,50 3 2 1 
Scenario 7 (1,1,1) 0,33 0,33 0,33 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 1 1 1 
 
Based on these scenarios, the average ranks over the years were calculated.  For 
example, in 1999 there were seven scenarios, and the average rank in 1999 was the 
weighted average of these seven scenarios. The results of this application for the years 
1999-2007 are displayed in Table 6.  
 
Table 6: Method 1- Ranking of the Co-ops Performance for 1999-2007 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Average 
Agrifirm 8,857 8,857 9,714 11,714 11,714 11,857 11,571 11,571 12,143 12 
Avebe 10,000 6,143 4,571 7,429 7,714 8,571 13,143 10,286 6,000 8 
Campina 10,143 10,286 9,429 9,857 10,429 10,571 9,286 10,429 12,857 11 
Cebeco 6,286 7,143 13,571 1,571 7,286 3,429 4,857 1,000 2,429 5 
Cehave 12,857 11,429 7,571 13,286 6,714 6,714 6,000 6,571 6,714 9 
CNB 1,000 2,000 2,286 4,143 3,143 6,143 5,429 5,429 3,429 3 
DOC Kaas 2,000 1,000 1,000 1,429 2,571 3,429 1,571 2,000 1,000 1 
Flora Holland 12,857 12,571 12,857 12,571 12,714 12,714 11,571 14,000 14,000 14 
ForFarmers 3,571 3,571 3,286 4,000 1,143 2,000 1,714 4,429 4,143 2 
Friesland Foods 7,714 4,571 6,286 8,429 9,000 7,143 6,571 7,571 8,714 6 
Royal Cosun 4,429 4,000 4,000 5,143 4,714 1,286 4,857 3,286 9,714 4 
The Greenery 8,429 13,714 9,714 7,429 6,429 9,286 4,857 7,429 10,714 10 
Vion 4,143 7,857 7,571 5,714 7,429 8,143 9,000 9,143 8,000 7 
ZON 12,714 11,857 12,286 12,286 14,000 13,857 13,143 11,857 5,143 13 
                      
Kendall's W 0,926 0,964 0,951 0,926 0,841 0,896 0,861 0,887 0,939  0,779 
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To make sure that the ranking is consistent over the years, Kendall’s coefficient of 
concordance (Kendall’s W) was calculated. This indicated the agreement among the ratings 
during a year. Kendall’s W ranges from 0 (no agreement) to 1 (complete agreement). As 
can be seen from Table 6, the coefficient was above 0.8 in every year. Thus, the rank of the 
co-ops was consistent for the scenarios during the years. In addition, the coefficient for the 
whole sample period was 0.779, indicating that the ranking was consistent for the whole 
period (1999-2007). The last column of Table 6 shows the average rank of the co-ops’ 
performance all over the years.  
The robustness check (method 2) defined the decision weights by means of 25 
random scenarios.  Every scenario generated individual weights that varied between 0 and 
1. In addition, the sum of the weights was supposed to be equal to 1.  Thus all criteria in 
total weighed 100 percent.  This method was used to check whether the results of method 1 
are robust.   
 
Table 7: Method 2 - Ranking of the Co-ops’ Performance for 1999-2007 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Average 
Agrifirm 8,880 7,840 9,680 11,840 11,360 11,440 11,280 11,400 11,720 12 
Avebe 10,560 6,520 4,320 7,200 7,200 8,120 13,440 11,360 4,960 8 
Campina 9,760 9,280 9,120 9,960 10,040 9,560 8,680 10,000 12,800 11 
Cebeco 6,400 7,240 13,640 1,400 7,240 3,320 4,720 1,240 1,920 5 
Cehave 13,000 11,920 7,720 13,520 6,360 6,320 7,280 6,280 7,240 10 
CNB 1,400 2,840 3,200 5,880 5,520 8,600 7,640 7,120 4,720 4 
DOC Kaas 2,520 1,000 1,280 1,920 4,440 6,000 2,440 2,880 1,720 1 
Flora Holland 12,800 12,480 12,400 12,440 12,440 13,000 11,760 13,760 14,000 14 
ForFarmers 3,040 3,320 3,400 4,560 1,800 1,880 1,360 4,320 3,560 2 
Friesland Foods 7,440 4,600 6,200 7,920 8,600 6,160 5,920 6,720 7,360 6 
Royal Cosun 4,240 3,840 3,800 4,480 3,600 1,520 4,720 3,200 8,840 3 
The Greenery 7,840 13,440 9,240 6,920 5,960 8,520 4,640 6,720 10,440 9 
Vion 4,520 8,840 8,320 5,080 6,560 7,760 8,560 8,920 8,440 7 
ZON 12,640 11,840 12,680 11,840 13,880 12,800 12,560 11,080 7,280 13 
                      
Kendall's W 0,897 0,913 0,875 0,878 0,674 0,752 0,815 0,802 0,852  0,664 
 
Based on the 25 scenarios, the average rank over the period 1999-2007 was 
calculated. Table 7 shows the results. The Kendall’s W statistic indicates that there is 
sufficient consistency during the years among the ratings; all coefficients are above 0.65.  
In addition, Kendall’s W for the whole period equals 0.664, and thus shows above average 
consistency among the rating.  In addition, by dividing the sample in 2 different groups 
generated the same results. The 2 groups were divided on the basis of the co-ops’ 
innovative features as described in the research design (see: Table 2). 
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Table 8: Average ranking of Group 1         Table 9: Average ranking of Group 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By rank-ordering the performance of co-ops within these two groups, one may gain 
insights on whether the overall ranking was consistent by examining fluctuations within the 
groups. The results are presented in the tables 8 and 9. It can be seen that the rank-order 
within the two different groups is exactly the same as the ranking of the co-ops in the whole 
sample. Therefore, the ranking itself was consistent over the years, among co-ops with 
different organizational innovations (i.e., different financial structures than the traditional 
one) and within groups of co-ops with same organizational innovations. 
 
5.3 Summary of the Results & Discussion 
 
The two methods differ in the way they treated the weights of the criteria. However, 
comparing the results derived from both methods, the ranking does not substantially differ. 
From the results presented in table 10, it can be seen that only 4 companies exhibited 
different rankings. These deviations were pair-wised, meaning that the overall change in 
rank was only 1 place. Thus, it can be argued that the ranking were consistent in both 
methods. More importantly, these results confirm the application of method 1, which has 
been criticized for being simplified. 
The empirical analysis attempted to explore whether the newly emerged ownership 
structures of co-ops perform better than the traditional ones. The results show that the top 4 
performers are DOCKaas, ForFarmers, CNB, and Royal Cosun, respectively. In addition, 
Agrifirm, ZON, and FloraHolland are top bottom 3 performers. The top and bottom 
performers have adopted mixed organizational innovations. Also, the results suggest that 
the viability of group 1 lacks behind group 2. In sum, there is no clear-cut evidence that the 
co-ops with innovative financial structures perform better than the co-ops with more 
traditional financial/ownership structures. 
Van Bekkum and Bijman (2006) showed that some new co-op models that have 
adopted financial innovations, exhibit IOF-alike equity features. Co-ops issued subordinate 
or permanent bonds, outside investors are attracted at a subsidiary and/or group level, or the 
organizational form is transformed to a limited liability company with the retention of 
ownership or the full conversion to an IOF.  In our sample these co-ops: Avebe, Campina, 
Cebeco, Friesland Food, ForFarmers, Royal Cosun, and Vion were expected to perform 
better, since additional equity provided them with new capital to finance growth 
opportunities, and start valuable new projects. However, Vion (IOF) is ranked 7
th
, 
indicating an average performance of the company. Next, Cebeco, which was ranked 5
th
,  
Co-op Name          Rank-order 
Agrifirm 6 
Cehave 4 
CNB 2 
DOC Kaas 1 
Flora Holland 8 
Royal Cosun 3 
The Greenery 5 
ZON 7 
 
Co-op Name                         Rank-order 
 
Avebe 5 
Campina 6 
Cebeco 2 
ForFarmers 1 
Friesland 
Foods 3 
Vion 4 
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has external investors contributing its equity structure and had adopted  the most IOF-alike 
structure.  Although these two co-ops fall in at the top half of the rank-order, they do not 
significantly outperform the co-ops with more traditional financial structure.  
Another interesting observation concerns Campina, which ranked 11
th
. Campina has 
multiple innovative structural features employed in the business to attract new equity. It 
seems that while Campina indeed attracted substantial amounts of outside equity, this 
increasing equity did not contribute to the overall viability of the firm. Furthermore, 
Friesland Foods and Avebe are also ranked in the middle, holding the 6
th
 and 8
th
 order, 
respectively. The ForFarmers, ranked 2
nd
, has been performing relatively well over the 
examined period, but, still, did not ranked above co-ops with a financial structure more 
traditionally organized. Interestingly, DOCKaas, one of the eight more “traditional”-
oriented co-ops was ranked 1
st
, and CNB was ranked 3
rd
. These results indicate that even 
co-ops with relatively smaller economic size and maintain more traditional ownership 
structures can be financially viable in terms of profitability, solvency, and managerial 
turnovers. DOCKaas dominated the other co-ops mostly in terms of the interest coverage 
ratio and basic earning power, which resulted in a large overall net flow. On the bottom end 
of the table, ZON and FloraHolland confirmed the expectations of relatively worst 
performers. Although, these results do not suggest a bad financial outlook for these co-ops, 
the other co-ops had shown a better performance over the examined time period.   
 
Table 10: Average ranking of the Co-ops’ Performance based on the Results of Both Methods 
Co-op Name Method 1 Method 2 
Agrifirm 12 12 
Avebe 8 8 
Campina 11 11 
Cebeco 5 5 
Cehave 9 10 
CNB 3 4 
DOC Kaas 1 1 
Flora Holland 14 14 
ForFarmers 2 2 
Friesland Foods 6 6 
Royal Cosun 4 3 
The Greenery 10 9 
Vion 7 7 
ZON 13 13 
 
 
 
Overall, these results confirm the general inferences in co-op economics that even 
co-ops with a traditional financial structure can perform at least as good as IOF-alike 
models (e.g., Leerman and Parliament, 1990; Hardesty and Salgia, 2004). For the selected 
co-ops the results highlight that attracting outside equity can help improve the viability of 
the business, but does not automatically imply a structural better position in terms of 
financial performance. Outside equity provides the possibility to finance growth 
opportunities and/or improve the viability of the co-op firms. However, consistent with our 
results, the co-ops with the largest turnovers are not always the co-ops with the best 
financial position. Thus, the co-ops that adapted financial innovations may need to improve 
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the overall viability in order to take full advantage of the outside equity. In addition, as the 
market share of these co-ops is substantial in the food markets, an alignment between their 
financial viability and market power should be established. Often, co-ops’ intensive focus 
on their market behaviour, results in disregarding of their financial viability and careful 
adaptation of new financial/ownership innovations. Co-ops may expand their businesses, 
market shares, product assortment and, hence, their turnover over time, but without 
ignoring the careful design of their financial attributes or overlooking crucial strategic 
issues with respect to their financial viability.  
6. Conclusive Remarks 
In this paper the financial performance of various co-ops models was studied by using a 
combination of multivariate data techniques and a financial engineering modelling 
framework. The performance of the 14 Dutch agribusiness co-ops was examined. The 
ranking, which was based on the financial indicators of the selected co-ops over a period of 
9 years, does not explain the economic outlook of co-ops (e.g., in financial distress), but it 
is rather a comparative ranking among the agribusiness co-ops on the basis of selected 
financial ratios which were used as criteria. The rank-order showed that a mixed ranking of 
the co-ops (with or without innovative ownership features) and recommends that there is no 
clear-cut evidence that the more IOF-alike co-op ownership models perform better than the 
more traditional ones. These findings may recommend that co-op firms’ financial 
performance is not necessarily constrained by the availability of internal funds provided by 
member-investors. That is, co-ops may need to weigh the advantages of debt (e.g., lower 
taxes compared to equity, investments in agressive marketing strategies) against its 
disadvantages (e.g., increased probability for debt, cost of bankruptcy) when considering 
individualization of their owneship structure through the implementation of specific 
ownership innovations (Myers & Majluf, 1984).  
Futhermore, the results raise the question whether co-ops’ conversion towards an 
IOF-alike ownership structure is indeed profitable. As co-ops pursue organizational reforms 
to attract outside equity, they may also ensure that more capital would be available for the 
funding of strategic investments and competitive strategies. Likewise, their market share 
may be expanded, their activities in the supply chain may be integrated and better co-
ordinated and, hence, their market power may be increased. As a consequence, co-ops may 
experience better financial viability. Although the arguments for re-engineering their 
ownership structure are sound, our results indicate that co-ops cannot fully exploit 
opportunities by attracting outside equity. This may reveal the need that the re-engineering 
of the ownership structure of co-ops should be focused on achieving financial viability in 
the long-run by implementing a well-organized strategic investment plan. That is, other 
factors such as the relationships with upstream/downstream agents, market power, intensity 
of competition within and across specific sectors and industries, etc., should be placed in 
the future research agenda. 
In this study, we assessed the performance of top 14 agribusiness co-ops in the 
Netherlands selected on the basis of their turnovers. Future research may expand the 
research design of this study by accounting for comparisons of the impact of different 
ownership structures on the performance of co-ops across and within sectors and industries. 
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The comparison of co-ops with similar markets and business purposes may reveal useful 
information regarding the financial viability of the same clusters of co-ops. The 
comparisons of the performance of different co-op models within sectors/industries may 
show what co-op models perform better than others in each sector/industry. It may be that 
the structural and dynamic characteristics of each sector/industry (horticultural vs. dairy) 
and relevant market conditions (perfect competitive vs. oligopolistic markets) that may 
influence the financial viability of co-ops over time. Yet, comparing and testing the impact 
of capital structure choices on the financial performance requires adjusting for the 
idiosyncrasies of the co-op organizational models in and across different sectors and 
inductries.  For example, it is appropriate to identify and study how co-ops capitalize on 
off-balance sheet operational leases for strategic (tangible or intagible) assets and make a 
choice regarding how far leases are treated as substitutes for debt. Modeling these 
idiosyncrasies is necessary to understand how co-op firms behave when devising their 
owenship structure. 
Another challenge is the following: the literature on co-ops’ performance has 
focused mainly on quantitative data analysis. In the current research, also, the income 
statements and balance sheets were used in order to derive relevant accounting data for the 
calculation of  the financial ratios, which allowed the comparison of co-ops’ financial 
viability over time. Such an approach does not take into account qualitative dimensions 
regarding the strategic behaviour of co-ops over time. For instance, co-ops may pursue 
strategies that may not enhance their financial viability in the short-run and, hence, may 
deteriorate their ranking. Our results provide no clear-cut evidence supporting the better 
financial viability of the new IOF-alike co-op models. This might be due to the fact that the 
BoD or professional managers of these co-ops have invested the additional capital in new 
projects. As a result, records on the cash flows which were not available in specific 
accounting years, did not immediately contribute to the financial viability of the examined 
co-ops. The collection and systematic analysis of qualitative data may allow us to gain 
crucial insights regarding the strategic behaviour of co-ops over time (e.g., where the 
additional capital has been invested in and when this may have a pay-off). Work is in 
progress for developing a methodological framework that may account for both quantitative 
and qualitative information regarding the performance of co-op models over time. This 
framework may enrich our understanding regarding the financial viability and strategic 
behaviour of competing forms of firm organization over time.  
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